

## Syllabus

[cmcd.economia@fgv.br]

**Course Name: Topics in Political Economy**

**Professor:**

**2025 FIRST SEMESTER**

### PROGRAM

This course offers a comprehensive overview of the micro-theoretical literature on protests. It examines how protests are modeled, with a focus on the technical tools employed to derive key results. Additionally, it explores related collective action problems, such as voter turnout in elections and contributions to public goods. Although the primary focus is theoretical, some empirical results will also be discussed.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

Class discussions will rely primarily on papers, but the following textbooks may be useful:

- Olson, Mancur. (1965). *The logic of collective action*. Contemporary Sociological Theory.
- Tarrow, Sidney G. (2011). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- DeNardo, James. (2014). *Power in numbers*. Princeton University Press.
- Chenoweth, Erica. (2021). *Civil Resistance: What everyone needs to know*. Oxford University Press.

We will discuss the following topics in class (tentative).

#### 1. Introduction

- a. Tullock, G. (1971). The paradox of revolution. *Public Choice*, 11:89–99.
- b. Van Belle, D. A. (1996). Leadership and Collective Action: The Case of Revolution. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(1):107–132.
- c. Lichbach, M. I. (1998). Contending theories of contentious politics and the structure-action problem of social order. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(Volume 1, 1998):401–424.
- d. Kalyvas, S. N. and Kocher, M. A. (2007). How “free” is free riding in civil wars?: Violence, insurgency, and the collective action problem. *World Politics*, 59(2):177–216.

#### 2. Thresholds

- a. Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. *American journal of sociology*, 83(6), 1420-1443.
- b. Kuran, T. (1991). The East European revolution of 1989: is it surprising that we were surprised?. *The American Economic Review*, 81(2), 121-125.

- c. Lohmann, S. (1994). Information aggregation through costly political action. *The American Economic Review*, 518-530.
- d. Lohmann, S. (1994). The dynamics of informational cascades: The Monday demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91. *World politics*, 47(1), 42-101.

### 3. Information aggregation

- a. Lohmann, S. (1993). A signaling model of informative and manipulative political action. *American Political Science Review*, 87(2), 319-333
- b. Battaglini, M. (2017). Public protests and policy making. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(1), 485-549.
- c. Battaglini, M., Morton, R. B., & Patacchini, E. (2020). Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests (No. w26757). National Bureau of Economic Research.

### 4. Coordination and Global Games

- a. Global Games
- b. Shadmehr, M. and Bernhardt, D. (2011). Collective action with uncertain payoffs: Coordination, public signals, and punishment dilemmas. *American Political Science Review*, 105(4):829–851.
- c. Chen, H. and Suen, W. (2017). Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism. *The Economic Journal*, 127(603):1318–1347.
- d. Lukyanov, G. (2025). Policy Signalling in Regime Change Games: A Welfare Analysis. Working paper.

### 5. Two stages coordination

- a. Angeletos, G., Hellwig, C., and Pavan, A. (2006). Signaling in a global game: Coordination and policy traps. *Journal of Political Economy*, 114(3):452–484.
- b. De Mesquita, E. B. (2010). Regime change and revolutionary entrepreneurs. *American Political Science Review*, 104(3):446–466.
- c. Edmond, C. (2013). Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change\*. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4):1422–1458.
- d. Shadmehr, M. (2015). Extremism in revolutionary movements. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 94:97–121.
- e. Little, A. T., Tucker, J. A., and LaGatta, T. (2015). Elections, protest, and alternation of power. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(4):1142–1156.
- f. Shadmehr, M. and Bernhardt, D. (2019). Vanguard in revolution. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 115:146–166.
- g. Chen, H. and Suen, W. (2021). Radicalism in mass movements: Asymmetric information and endogenous leadership. *American Political Science Review*, 115(1):286–306.
- h. Jara, P. and Matta, B. (2025). The role of endogenous payoff over public coordination equilibrium. Working paper.

## 6. Revisiting free-raiding issues

- a. Shadmehr, M. (2021). Protest puzzles: Tullock's paradox, hong kong experiment, and the strength of weak states. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 16:245–264.
- b. Hsieh, C.-S., Deer, L., Konig, M., and Vega-Redondo, F. (2023). Riot networks and the tullock paradox: An application to the egyptian arab spring. Working paper.
- c. Matta, B. (2025). Sequential protest formation. Working paper.

## 7. Dynamic games

- a. Meirowitz, A. and Tucker, J. A. (2013). People power or a one-shot deal? a dynamic model of protest. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2):478–490.
- b. Correa, S. (2022). Persistent protests. Technical report, Working Paper.
- c. Gieczewski, G. and Kocak, K. (2023). Altruism in protests.
- d. Mutluer, K. (2024). Leading by example among equals. Technical
- e. report, Working Paper.

## 8. Empirical evidence

- a. Keddie, N. R. (1983). Iranian revolutions in comparative perspective. *The American Historical Review*, 88(3), 579-598
- b. Madestam, A., Shoag, D., Veuger, S., & Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2013). Do political protests matter? evidence from the tea party movement. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(4), 1633-1685.
- c. Acemoglu, D., Hassan, T. A., & Tahoun, A. (2018). The power of the street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 31(1), 1-42
- d. Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., & Zhang, Y. J. (2019). Protests as strategic games: experimental evidence from Hong Kong's antiauthoritarian movement. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2), 1021-1077.
- e. Enikolopov, R., Makarin, A., & Petrova, M. (2020). Social media and protest participation: Evidence from Russia. *Econometrica*, 88(4), 1479-1514.
- f. Bursztyn, L., Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., & Zhang, Y. J. (2021). Persistent political engagement: Social interactions and the dynamics of protest movements. *American Economic Review: Insights*, 3(2), 233-50.
- g. Cantoni, D., Kao, A., Yang, D. Y., and Yuchtman, N. (2024). Protests. *Annual Review of Economics*, 16(Volume 16, 2024):519–543.

## 9. Voting: turnout paradox

- a. Tullock, G. 1967. *Toward a mathematics of politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- b. Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American Political Science Review*, 62(1): 25–42.
- c. Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H. (1985). Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. *American Political Science Review*, 79(1):62–78.

## 10. Public goods

- a. Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H. (1984). Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis. *Journal of Public Economics*, 24(2):171–193.
- b. Admati, A. R. and Perry, M. (1991). Joint Projects without Commitment. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 58(2):259–276.
- c. Marx, L. M. and Matthews, S. A. (2000). Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 67(2):327–358.

## GRADING

The evaluation for this course will be based on:

- **Two referee reports:** 15% each.
- **Class participation:** 10%.
- **Research project:** two progress reports, 15% each, and a presentation, 30%.

The goal of the research project is to apply the tools you've learned to a research idea of your choice; the topic need not be related to protests—any application is acceptable. You may work individually or in pairs. Progress reports are due on [Date] and [Date]. The presentation date and time given for each presentation will be set based on the number of students.

## CONTACT

- **Email:**
- **Office Hours:** ? (office )

## DISABILITY INFORMATION

If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modifications, please notify the instructor no later than the first week of the term. You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to determine the appropriateness of accommodations. It is important to communicate any needs as early as possible to ensure that suitable arrangements can be made.