

Syllabus

[cmcd.economia@fgv.br]

Course: Microeconomics IV

Professor:

2016 THIRD SEMESTER

PROGRAM

The objective of this course is to present the basics of Economics of Information, which is (in broad terms) the study of asymmetric information.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, *Contract Theory*, MIT Press, 2004 (*)

Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford University Press, 1995 (*)

Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny, *Advanced Microeconomic Theory*, 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall, 2011.

Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, *The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model*, Princeton University Press, 2002.

Bernard Salanié, *The Economics of Contracts: A Primer*, 2nd Edition, MIT Press, 2005.

Inés Macho-Stadler and J. David Pérez-Castrillo, *An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts*, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001.

(*) main text

GRADING

The course evaluation consists of a single final exam. The questions on the exam are taken (sometimes with slight modifications) from three problem sets that I distribute throughout the course.

II - O peso atribuído à nota de cada uma das formas de avaliação da disciplina é determinado pelo professor da disciplina e deve constar explicitamente do respectivo programa, não sendo permitido atribuir peso superior a 60% (sessenta por cento) a nenhuma das formas de avaliação especificadas.]

PROFESSOR - EMAILS

DETAILED PROGRAM

- 1- Adverse Selection
- 2- Moral Hazard
- 3- Mechanism Design